Name: The Volatility Curse: Exogenous Shocks and Representation in Resource-Rich Democracies (en Inglés)
Price: 2202.50 MXN
Availability: InStock
Author: Daniela Campello; Cesar Zucco
ISBN: 9781108841795

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portada The Volatility Curse: Exogenous Shocks and Representation in Resource-Rich Democracies (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Autor

Daniela Campello; Cesar Zucco

Año

2020

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

260

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

ISBN13

9781108841795

Categorías

Estados unidos de américa
Política y gobierno

The Volatility Curse: Exogenous Shocks and Representation in Resource-Rich Democracies (en Inglés)

Daniela Campello; Cesar Zucco (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Dura

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Reseña del libro "The Volatility Curse: Exogenous Shocks and Representation in Resource-Rich Democracies (en Inglés)"

The Volatility Curse examines the conditions under which economic voting can (and cannot) function as a mechanism of democratic accountability, challenging existing theories that are largely based on experiences in developed democracies. Drawing on cross-national data from around the world and micro-level evidence from Latin America, Daniela Campello and Cesar Zucco make two broad, related arguments. First, they show that economic voting is pervasive around the world, but in economically volatile developing democracies that are dependent on commodity exports and inflows of foreign capital, economic outcomes are highly contingent on conditions beyond government control, which nonetheless determine relevant political outcomes like elections, popular support, and government transitions. Second, politicians are aware of these misattribution patterns and are often able to anticipate their electoral prospects well before elections. This reduces incumbents' incentives to maximize voter welfare, as anticipated by economic voting theories, and increases the likelihood of shirking, waste, and corruption.